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This comment argues against piercing by default, a regime that the arguments of the main
piece do not justify. Piercing of subsidiaries' veil in contract law is justified but under exceptional
circumstances and presumed piercing would not cover all of them. Legislatures, courts, and
agencies have moved to validate rather than undermine limited liability. Moreover, automatic
piercing would erode the socially desirable incentive for business creation that limited liability
provides, reduce or eliminate the markets for venture capital, buyouts and corporate control, and
preclude the flexible financing that limited liability makes possible.
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1. Introduction
The article of the renowned Professors Blumberg and Strasser, who are also dear
co-authors of mine,' can be read as extending a readily acceptable statement, that
the law of piercing the corporate veil should adapt to the legal environment of its
application. The consequence of this adaptability would be easier piercing in
those legal areas where it is merited but no change in others. There the current
regime would apply, which views piercing as an extraordinary remedy.
Allow me, however, to play devil's advocate perhaps and argue against an
excessive reading of their thesis. Professors Blumberg and Strasser's piercing
thesis could also be read to argue that in most legal areas the corporate veil should
be ignored, because the corporate veil is already easily ignored in some aspects of
securities regulation, labor law, tax law and civil procedure. This version of the
article's thesis is extreme. It is in conflict with a long and well justified
jurisprudential tradition that veil piercing is an extraordinary remedy that courts
undertake on exceptional circumstances to redress abuses of the corporate form.
By definition, a corporate parent's desire to take advantage of the limited liability
that the corporate form offers is not abusive by itself. Otherwise, there would be
no limited liability for subsidiaries. Since one could also read Professors
Blumberg and Strasser's article to argue that subsidiaries should have no limited
liability, this comment will address that in Part 3. Part 2 will argue assuming that
subsidiaries' limited liability is accepted. In other words, Part 2 asks, assuming
that limited liability for subsidiaries can be desirable in at least some
circumstances, do the arguments lead to the conclusion that parent corporations
should be liable for subsidiaries' deficits as a default rule? Part 3 will argue that
the limited liability of subsidiaries is desirable on the merits.
2. No Piercing by Default
The proper interpretation of the fact that the legislature has chosen to ignore the
corporate veil in some areas of law is that in the remaining areas, the veil should
not be ignored. In the rest of the legal system, piercing the corporate veil should
continue to be an extraordinary measure. I offer four arguments. Contract law
should not be seen as a legal field where the courts have adopted enterprise
principles. The legislative action is produced by unique considerations of each
legal field. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the exceptional nature of veil
1 See Blumberg, Strasser, Georgakopoulos and Gouvin, BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS
(2004).
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piercing. Finally, similar legislative moves in other legal fields have not let to a
reversal of the corresponding overarching legal principles.
2.1 Inapposite Contract Law
Having myself argued in favor of veil piercing in contract, I could hardly disagree
with the authors (and the evidence). 2 Courts pierce the veil relatively often in
contract disputes. Nevertheless, piercing remains exceptional. Whereas courts
occasionally apply enterprise principles in contract law, one should not form the
impression of a presumption in favor of veil piercing. Special arguments apply in
cases where the abuse of the corporate form or its control frustrates the purposes
of contract law. Courts only pierce the corporate veil when exceptional
circumstances occur.
One of the paradigmatic opinions where piercing is justified, illustrates the
wrong that necessitates the piercing as well as the insufficiency of the solution
proposed by Professors Blumberg and Strasser. The wrong is subversion of the
operation of contract law. The insufficiency is that piercing by default would not
lead to piercing in this case.
Contract law can be subverted when a controlling entity can induce
another to breach a contract without either entity truly suffering the full financial
consequences of the breach. While it happens in cases of insolvent subsidiaries,
that does not argue for piercing by default. First, solvent subsidiaries do have the
incentives not to breach. They do suffer the financial consequences of breaching
their contracts. Moreover, the same circumstances can exist outside the parent-
subsidiary context. Therefore, courts must not lose vigilance about identifying
piercing circumstances, as they might if a default rule provides for piercing.
To illustrate subversion of contract law outside the parent-subsidiary
context, consider an example positing several farmers, an intermediary buyer (a
grain elevator named Warren) and a large corporate user of grain called Cargill. 3
Suppose that the farmers choose to reduce the risk they bear by entering into
"forward" grain contracts with grain buyers for some fraction of each farmer's
expected crop of grain.
After the forward contract, if grain prices rise, the contract benefits the
buyer. If prices drop, it benefits the selling farmer. The enforcement mechanism
of contract law, breach damages, induces the parties to abide by their agreement.
If either would breach, the other would make the covering market transaction and
contract law would give the covering party a claim for the financial consequences
2 Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil-Piercing, 13 STANF. J. OF LAW BUSINESS
AND FINANCE 121 (2007).
3 The example is based on the facts of A. Gay Jensen Farms v. Gargill, 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn.,
1981).
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of the breach. If, for example, grain prices fell and the buyer refused to perform,
the farmers would sell at the lower prices and have a claim for their deficiency
(compared to the contract price) against the buyer.
Granted, the incentive scheme of contract law can fail. This happens when
the breaching party is insolvent. The obligation that the breach would create is
ineffective because the breaching party bears no financial consequence.
Imagine that Cargill happens to lend to Warren and subsequently Warren's
financial circumstances aggravate. Warren becomes insolvent at a time when the
price changes of the grain on outstanding grain purchases make Warren's
contracts worth performing (rather than breaching and buying the grain on the
open market). Grain prices have risen. Cargill can see that performance by
Warren will also lead to subsequent performance of Warren's contacts to sell
grain to Cargill. Whereas an ordinary lender would let the indebted grain elevator
fail and collect a fractional amount of the claim in bankruptcy, Cargill
experiences an extra gain from continuing to finance Warren. If Cargill were to
push Warren into bankruptcy, then not only would Cargill's loans receive a few
cents on the dollar (fractionally paid in bankruptcy) but Cargill would also have to
buy grain in the higher prices of the open market. So Cargill does not prosecute its
claim.
Cargill finances the grain buyer during a few seasons. During those
seasons the price of grain changes in a way beneficial to Cargill. It rises before
each harvest. Then a season comes when grain price drops instead of rising. This
time Cargill realizes that instead of the above double harm from letting the grain
elevator fail, it will only recognize one (unavoidable, now) harm and have one
benefit. Cargill's loan will not be repaid (as it never would) but Cargill will
benefit from buying grain in the open market. Accordingly, Cargill refuses further
credit, Warren fails and breaches its contracts with the farmers. As Warren and
Cargill are unrelated entities, the ordinary outcome would be that the breach
claims of the farmers and the loan claim of Cargill would be fractionally paid in
bankruptcy with a few cents on the dollar.
The farmers invoke lender liability, a theory akin to veil piercing, and seek
to impose liability on Cargill for Warren's breach. Despite fairly weak indications
of control of Warren by Cargill, the court finds that Cargill has made Warren into
its agent, akin to piercing the veil separating Cargill from Warren. Cargill is liable
for its agent's breach of the contracts with the farmers.
Cargill had managed to put itself in a position where it had subverted
contract law. Cargill had managed to use Warren as a contracting puppet that
Cargill could sacrifice with no financial consequence. Cargill had changed the
nature of the contracts with the farmers. Contract law would operate only to
Cargill's benefit if the farmers breached. When it became advantageous to breach,
Cargill would not suffer. The example illustrates the importance of piercing in
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contract. Without piercing, puppeteers can subvert contract law. More
importantly, it illustrates that piercing is not enough, since the same phenomenon
can arise in settings that do not involve parents and subsidiaries, as it did in the
example.
The example also illustrates the insufficiency of piercing by default. Even
if the legal system had espoused the thesis of Blumberg and Strasser for piercing
by default, that would not lead to liability of Cargill because it is not Warren's
parent. Rather, adoption of piercing by default could reduce the vigilance of the
courts to identify subversions of contract law's incentives and make the courts
more reluctant to apply doctrines equivalent to piercing, such as lender liability,
substantive consolidation, equitable receivership, or marshalling.
2.2 Legislature has Acted in Extraordinary Areas
The legislature's choice to reverse the presumption against veil piercing in some
legal fields is justified by considerations unique to those fields. It would be wrong
to infer from this legislative choice, a legislative predisposition or support for the
corporate veil to be readily pierced in other areas of law. The expansive reach or
securities regulation can be justified by the extraordinary importance of protecting
the integrity of the capital markets, to which the Supreme Court also subscribed,
for example, in its opinion in Basic.4 In labor law, the easy piercing of the
corporate veil can easily be justified by a legislative desire to grant extraordinary
protection to unionized labor. In tax law, the application of enterprise principles
may be justified by an extraordinary concern over tax revenues coupled with the
relative ease for the taxpaying parent of avoiding tax consequences otherwise.
The ease with which enterprise principles have been applied in those fields
(and have recently been expanded, for example with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
which expands the concept of enterprise principles in securities regulation) argues
that the legislature can readily do the same in other areas. Rather than urge the
courts to adopt enterprise principles in every legal field, the explicit adoption of
enterprise principles in those areas suggests that other areas of law have not
produced concerns that would lead to the adoption of enterprise principles and
automatic veil piercing. Rather, the specificity of the exceptions should be seen to
weigh in favor of the status quo that veil piercing is exceptional.
2.3 The Courts Side with Extraordinary Piercing
One can easily argue that precedent of the Supreme Court is misguided and
should be reversed. However, absent a reversal, such precedent suggests that
'Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1987).
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arguments to deviate from it are imbued with an additional futility. The idea that
the corporate veil should be readily ignored in some legal areas suffers that
futility.
The Supreme Court underscored the exceptional nature of veil piercing in
Bestfoods.5 The court opined on environmental law, a subject that the majority of
the circuit courts had interpreted the corresponding statute as setting a regime
where the corporate veil would be readily pierced.6 The contrary holding of the
Supreme Court dramatically undermines the idea that the corporate veil should be
readily pierced.
2.4 Legislature Promotes Limited Liability
The legislature has chosen to reverse longstanding common law principles such as
buyer beware in some parts of consumer protection and of securities regulation.
This has not led to a wholesale departure from the principle of buyer beware in
other areas of law, such as real estate, commercial, or intellectual property
contracts. The exceptional nature of veil piercing is similarly part of the fabric of
the legal system. The deviation from that presumption in some areas of law does
not indicate that a general reversal is desirable.
Legislative action has been in the opposite direction. Legislatures have
adopted en masse the new vehicle for limited liability, the Limited Liability
Company. If legislatures felt that limited liability were harmful, they could either
resist and not enact an LLC statute or deviate from limited liability by providing
for easy piercing by statutory language.
One could argue that the legislative adoption of LLC statutes does not
signify acceptance of limited liability. For such an argument to hold, however,
one would have to show that the legislatures were unaware of their ability to
legislatively ease piercing or that they were forced to accept a form of limited
liability for LLCs that they found disagreeable. No such argument can be made.
3. Merits of Not Piercing Subsidiaries
The arguments in favor of limited liability are league (see, e.g., Easterbrook &
Fischel 1996, Presser 1992). Here, only three less frequent ones are discussed.
Business creation is crucial for economic growth but it depends on lack of
automatic piercing. Automatic piercing would change the way business is
organized, undermining economic integration, venture financing and the market
5 U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 53 (1998).
6 See, generally, George J. Weiner, Lara Bernstein Mathews, Parent Corporation and Individual
Liability Under Cercla After Bestfoods, 13 NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT 456 (1999).
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for control. Automatic piercing would end a regime that allows flexibility of
independence and impose enormous burdens on the financing of business.
3.1 The Social Desirability ofRisk Reduction
That legislatures consistently keep providing vehicles with limited liability is no
accident. Business entails risks and neither individuals nor institutions easily
accept to shoulder new risk. Entrepreneurs and parent corporations who engage in
new business ventures place new ventures in business entities with limited
liability so as to avoid exposing their other assets to each venture's risk.
Society is effectively diversified, having a stake in every business, but
neither individual entrepreneurs nor parent companies are diversified with regard
to entrepreneurial risk. Thus, we should fully expect that society wants to
encourage entrepreneurs and parent corporations to take the risk of new ventures
that they would be unwilling to take. Providing them with limited liability is a
small inducement to provide the very valuable service of starting businesses.
3.2 Distortions from Automatic Piercing
Automatic piercing would radically alter the ownership structure, the financing
and control of business. The joint ownership of synergistic businesses reduces the
cost of integrated enterprises. Financing of new ventures depends on the
availability of venture capital. The efficient operation of businesses depends on
the threat of an acquisition from private equity of buyout firms. All those depend
on the continued respect of the limited liability of subsidiaries.
If veil piercing were automatic then parent corporations who have placed
synergistic businesses in subsidiaries would face an additional cost, the danger
that they will be liable for the subsidiary's deficit. Thus, automatic piercing would
be an obstacle against the integration of businesses or an incentive for
divestitures.
Automatic piercing would be disastrous for businesses that routinely buy
and sell large stakes in other businesses, such as venture capital, private equity
and takeover firms. Limited liability ensures that such owners can buy and sell
businesses without each harming the rest of their portfolio. Automatic piercing
would render the entire portfolio hostage to the failure of a single business.
3.3 Automatic Piercing is an Inflexible Change
One of the themes that pervade business law is flexibility. Flexibility allows the
infinite creativity of contracts and business arrangements that can be customized
7
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to circumstances. The existing regime of limited liability for subsidiaries is
actually flexible. Automatic piercing is not.
Limited liability is waivable through guarantees whereas automatic
piercing would be an unavoidable consequence. The result is that businesses now
have the flexibility of changing the degree of their limited liability as
circumstances change while automatic piercing would eliminate that flexibility. In
the current regime of limited liability, parties desiring additional security can
obtain it in the form of guarantees by related entities. It is important to notice that
parties that seek security do not have a direct interest to prevent their
counterparties from starting businesses or acquiring subsidiaries. In a world of
automatic piercing, however, parties that seek additional security would need to
protect themselves against the taking of new risks such as the starting of new
businesses or the acquisition of subsidiaries, because those would expose the
parent to unlimited liability. Thus, not only is the current regime more
customizable but also any customization induced by a regime of automatic
piercing would tend to be socially undesirable for it would tend to stifle business
creation.
Conclusion
The excellent paper of Professors Blumberg and Strasser should not be read too
broadly. They correctly argue the law does and should stand willing to pierce the
corporate veil in many areas of law with sensitivity to the circumstances of each
area of the law. It would be excessive and socially undesirable, however, to accept
an argument that veil piercing should be automatic for subsidiaries.
Limited liability has been defended several times. Easterbrook and Fishel
(1996) offer numerous arguments in favor of the limited liability of large
corporations that were not pursued here. Those arguments are founded on the
instrumental role of limited liability for diversification, monitoring, and the
market for control. They all apply to subsidiaries. Presser (1992) defends limited
liability as an integral component of the political economy of the entrepreneurial,
free market society. While some have argued for pro rata liability (as has
Professor Blumberg, 1986, as well as, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, 1991) the
arguments of the present comment also argue against pro rata liability. Venture
capital, leveraged buyout and private equity funds could be wiped out from the
catastrophic failure of a single company in their portfolio in a regime of pro rata
liability.
The strength of the desirability of limited liability and exceptional piercing
obviates the need to even refer to the weaker arguments against piercing by
default. Unlimited liability of a parent for subsidiary obligations would frustrate
many regulated industries, where clarity of the assets and the obligations of
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entities in a corporate pyramid is essential. Also, lenders rely on their debtors'
financial statements but in a world of automatic piercing lenders would need to
perform due diligence on every subsidiary continuously. Moreover, the
implementation of automatic piercing would force the legal system to establish
the exact amount of control that leads to piecing, something that the Supreme
Court has avoided, for example, by overruling the adoption of the sale of business
doctrine by practically all circuits in the case of Landreth Timber rather than
expose courts to having to wrestle with what fraction of ownership constitutes
control .
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